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TURNING BACK THE CLOCK: THE ASSAULT
ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
LELAND WARE*
INTRODUCTION
In 1989 the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to affirmative
action programs created by state and local governments in City of
Richmond v. Croson.' In 1995 the Court extended the Croson
rationale to the federal government in Adarand Constructors v.
Pena. The following year, in Hopwood v. Texas,3 the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that an affirmative action admission
program used by the law school at the University of Texas was
unconstitutional. In 1997 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reinstated Proposition 209, a ballot initiative that outlawed
affirmative action programs in the state of California. This followed
* Professor of Law, St. Louis University School of Law. This Article is based on
remarks that were presented by the author at the 1997 annual meeting of the Congressional
Black Caucus Foundation in Washington, D.C. The author also explored some of the ideas
expressed in this Article in his article, Tales From the Crypt: Does Strict Scrutiny Sound the
Death Knell for Affirmative Action in Higher Education?, 23 J.C. & U.L. 43 (1996).
1. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
2. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
3. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
4. See id. at 934.
5. See Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 97 (1997). A district court granted a preliminary injunction against the
measure on the grounds that it denied women and minorities equal protection of the law in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See 946 F. Supp.
1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court. See
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an earlier decision by the California Board of Regents to ban
affirmative action admissions and hiring in the University of
California system.6 This pattern of erosion has caused many
observers.to predict the demise of affirmative action. This judgment,
however, is at best premature. Recent court decisions have been
increasingly critical of affirmative action programs, but, thus far, they
have stopped short of declaring all forms of affirmative action
unlawful.
Affirmative action provokes an unusually sharp reaction from its
opponents. Using coded phrases such as "quotas" and "preferential
treatment," they proceed from a flawed but widely held assumption
that affirmative action necessarily entails the displacement of
qualified white males with demonstrably less qualified minorities. On
the other side of the debate are affirmative action advocates. They
consider the conditions resulting from discriminatory activities from
the perspective of groups that have been injured by an elaborate
system of racial exclusion. Affirmative action, they contend,
promotes equality and advances the unfinished process of
desegregation.
The Supreme Court has embraced an approach that treats all race-
conscious decisions the same, irrespective of the motives of the
decision-maker or the relative positions of the groups that are
affected. This view is reflected in the majority opinions in Croson
and Adarand, which held, in effect, that all racial classifications are
the same, whether they are reflected in a segregation ordinance from
the pre-Brown era, or in a policy that is intended to advance the goal
of desegregation.7
During its 1997-1998 term, the Supreme Court was slated to
decide Taxman v. Board of Education.8 This case involved
affirmative action in employment, but it had implications that
extended beyond the immediate questions that the plaintiff presented.
Taxman might have decided whether diversity will continue to be a
122 F.3d at 711. It found that Proposition 209 was not unconstitutional because it did not create
any impermissible legislative classifications or restrict the rights of women and minorities. See
1d. at 701-12.
6. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
7. See 488 U.S. 469 (1989); 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
8. 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997).
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justification for affirmative action in educational settings, but the
parties settled before the Court issued its decision. 9 This avoided
what many observers anticipated as a probable setback for
affirmative action. However, this disposition has merely postponed
what is surely an inevitable confrontation as cases challenging
affirmative action policies are continuously pending in lower courts.
One such case will eventually be decided by the Supreme Court.
There is a legitimate debate about affirmative action, but much of
the rhetoric appeals to sentiment rather than reason. One example of
this is the invocation of "color-blindness" as an argument against
affirmative action.10 This contention has a superficial appeal, but it
does not withstand analysis. Color-blindness would treat black and
white Americans as if they were similarly-situated when, in reality,
they are not. It requires one to discount entirely the history and
context of race-relations in America. Color-blindness is the goal to
which most of us aspire, but the adoption of such an absolutist
approach will not promote equality. The Civil Rights laws of the
1960s did not eliminate the racial hierarchy that segregation created.
There are still significant disparities that are directly attributable to
the continuing effects of segregation on African-Americans and other
people of color. The laws prohibiting discrimination represented a
starting point rather than a final solution. Instead of advancing
equality, the imposition of a color-blind standard will prolong the
inequalities that developed during an era of official racial
subordination.
This Article considers the legal and policy issues presented by
affirmative action in higher education. Part I examines the evolution
of affirmative action jurisprudence in the Supreme Court. Beginning
with the 1978 decision of Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke," the Supreme Court affirmed the validity of affirmative
action policies. Nonetheless, a majority of the Justices could not
agree on the relevant analytical framework for evaluating the
constitutionality of affirmative action programs. After a decade of
9. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
10. See DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLITICS, CULTURE,
AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA (1996).
11. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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failing to reach a consensus, the majority of Justices finally decided,
in City of Richmond v. Croson,12 to apply strict scrutiny to programs
created by state and local governments.
3
Part II examines the effect of strict scrutiny on college and
university affirmative action programs. After Croson, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit struck down a race-
targeted scholarship program. 14 In a separate case, the Fifth Circuit
invalidated a law school's affirmative action admissions policy. 15 The
courts in both cases found that the programs did not have a
compelling justification and were not narrowly tailored to achieve the
goal of enhancing minority enrollment. 16
Part III examines the problems that were presented by the peculiar
facts of Taxman, a case that might have undermined the foundation
for affirmative action programs established by colleges and
universities. 17 Part IV explains the unique justifications for
affirmative action in higher education-the most important of which
are considerations of diversity and academic freedom. Finally, Part V
considers the future of affirmative action in light of the Supreme
Court's evolving interpretation of this policy.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DECISIONS
Cases alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment 18 are analyzed under three separate standards
of review: rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.
Segregation ordinances and other laws that classify on the basis of
race historically have been subjected to strict scrutiny, the most
exacting of these measures. Under strict scrutiny, classifications that
are based on race must have a "compelling justification" and the
means that the government employs must be "narrowly tailored" to
12. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
13. See id. at 470, 508.
14. See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1128
(1995).
15. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
16. See id. at 934; Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 158-60.
17. See 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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achieving the goals of the legislation. 19 After segregation in public
schools was declared unlawful, the courts struck down other laws that
enforced segregation because the laws were not reasonably related to
any legitimate governmental goal. Strict in theory almost always
meant fatal in fact.
Affirmative action involves racial classifications, but unlike
segregation ordinances, it is intended to benefit, rather than disfavor,
African-Americans and other minorities. When affirmative action
cases first reached the Supreme Court, some of the Justices argued
that racial classifications that are used to remedy the effecs of
discriminatory practices should not be subjected to strict scrutiny.20
Recognizing that the original premise of affirmative action was a
recognition of the need to protect "discrete and insular minorities,
' 2
'
they believed that classifications established to ameliorate the present
effects of segregation are not the same as acts of invidious
discrimination.22 This reflected a reformist interpretation that views
anti-discrimination laws as a means of rectifying the inequalities that
segregation established. Another group of Justices contended that any
racial classification is inherently suspect and cannot be justified in the
absence of a compelling justification.23 This debate remained
19. See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 14.3, at 575 (4th ed. 1991).
20. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), was the first
affirmative action case to reach the Supreme Court. It involved a challenge to the admissions
process used by the medical school at the University of California at Davis. See id. at 272-77.
The Justices issued six separate opinions. Justice Powell's opinion was joined in part by
Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall, who also issued a separate joint opinion. See id. at 269-
320 (Powell, J.); id. at 324-79 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Separate opinions were authored by Justices White, Marshall, and
Blackmun. See id. at 379-87 (opinion of White, J.); id. at 387-402 (opinion of Marshall, J.); id.
at 402-08 (opinion of Blackmun, J.). Another opinion was submitted by Justice Stevens, who
was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist. See id. at 408-21
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Burger, C.J., & Stewart,
Rehnquist, JJ.).
21. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
22. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 19.
23. Members of this group have included Justices Warren Burger, William Rehnquist,
and, more recently, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. In the statutory context, one faction
of the Court took the position that the anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994), did not prohibit employers from
developing race-conscious hiring and promotion criteria, as long as the employer had an
adequate basis for believing that minority candidates had been denied equal opportunities in the
1998]
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unresolved for more than a decade.
After a change in the composition of the Court, the Court's 1989
City of Richmond v. Croson24 decision ended the deadlock. In
Croson, a majority of Justices held, for the first time, that strict
scrutiny applies to affirmative action plans developed by state and
local governments. Croson involved a minority contracting program
that was established by the City of Richmond, Virginia.26 Under the
program contractors who performed work for the City were required
to allocate at least thirty percent of their subcontracts to minority
entrepreneurs.27 The City of Richmond denied the plaintiff, J.A.
Croson Company, a city contract because the company failed to
satisfy Richmond's minority participation requirements. 28  The
company subsequently filed a civil action alleging, among other
things, violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 9 When the case reached the Supreme Court, the
majority of Justices held that all racial classifications are inherently
suspect, including those that are intended to benefit the victims of
discriminatory practices. 30 Applying this standard to the facts of the
past. The opposing group countered that Title VII forbade employers from considering race or
sex when making any personnel decisions. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193 (1979) (Burger, C.J. dissenting); see also Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480
U.S. 616, 664-68 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White, J., in parts
I and II).
24. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
25. See id. at 493-98.
26. See id. at 477-81. Richmond adopted its Minority Business Utilization Plan in 1983,
codified as City Code § 12-156(a) (1985), requiring prime contractors to subcontract no less
than 30% of the dollar amount of the prime contract to minority business enterprises; this plan
did not apply to minority-owned businesses that were awarded city contracts. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 483.
29. See id. Initially, the district court upheld Richmond's Minority Business Utilization
Plan, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. See J.A. Croson Co. v. City of
Richmond, 779 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1985). Croson then sought certiorari from the Supreme
Court, which vacated and remanded the case for consideration in light of the court's intervening
Wygant decision. See 478 U.S. 1016 (1986). The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the Court
of Appeals's decision to strike down Richmond's program in J.A. Croson Co. v. City of
Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir. 1987), as "violating both prongs of strict scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 488 U.S. at 470 (citing 822 F.2d 1355
(4th Cir. 1987)).
30. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-98. Justice O'Connor argued that "[c]lassifications based
on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings,
they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility."
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case, the Court found that there was no "compelling justification" for
the program because there was not an adequate record of
discrimination in Richmond's construction industry.31 Furthermore,
the Court found that the Richmond program was not "narrowly
tailored" to achieving the City's stated goal of increasing the number
of minority contractors who received city contracts because the goals
were not tied to the availability of minority businesses.32 In striking
down Richmond's program, Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion did
not entirely foreclose the use of affirmative action. She suggested that
programs established to eliminate the lingering effects of
discrimination could satisfy the "compelling justification"
requirement of strict scrutiny.33 The opinion also implied that such
programs could be "narrowly tailored" if the participation goals were
Id. at 493. Central to the majority's conclusion was the idea that "rights created by the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual." Id. (citing
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)). The combination of these two ideas led the
majority to conclude that "to whatever racial group these citizens belong, their 'personal rights'
to be treated with equal dignity and respect are implicated by a rigid rule erecting race as the
sole criterion in an aspect of public decision making." Id. In so holding, the majority rejected
the argument that a lower level of scrutiny should apply to racial classifications that have a
benign or remedial purpose. According to the Court "[tihe mere recitation of a benign or
compensatory purpose for the use of a racial classification would essentially entitle the States to
exercise the full power of Congress under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and insulate any
racial classification from judicial scrutiny under § 1." Id. at 490.
31. See id. at 498-505. The majority asserted that the district court erroneously relied on
several factors in finding past discrimination in Richmond's construction industry. First, the
district court used an incorrect statistical comparison between the percentage of blacks in
Richmond and the percentage of prime contracts awarded to minority firms. The Supreme
Court held that the trial court should have compared the number of qualified minority
contractors in Richmond to the number of contracts actually awarded to such qualified minority
contractors. Justice O'Connor also found that the district court misjudged the probative value of
evidence that reflected low minority membership in contractor associations because such low
membership could be attributable to a variety of factors independent of race. After eliminating
these indicia of past discrimination, the Court held that "none of the evidence presented by the
city points to any identified discrimination in the Richmond construction industry." Id. at 505.
Without such evidence, "an amorphous claim that there has been past discrimination in a
particular industry cannot justify the use of an unyielding quota." Id. at 499.
32, See id. at 507-08. First, the Court criticized the City of Richmond for failing to
consider race-neutral solutions. Second, the Court reasoned that the quota "rests upon the
'completely unrealistic' assumption that minorities will choose a particular trade in lockstep
proportion to their representation in the local population." Id. at 507 (citation omitted).
Ultimately, the Court found that "it is almost impossible to assess whether the Richmond Plan
is narrowly tailored to remedy prior discrimination since it is not linked to identified
discrimination in any way." Id.
33. See id. at 509.
1998]
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tied to the availability of minority contractors in the local market
area.
34
Following its Croson decision, in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC,
35
the Supreme Court affirmed the validity of regulations established by
the Federal Communications Commission that granted preferences to
minority purchasers of broadcasting licenses.36 The majority of
Justices declined to apply strict scrutiny to the FCC regulations.37
This decision initially appeared to preserve a lower level of review
for federal programs, but five years later the Supreme Court
overruled Metro Broadcasting with its decision in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.38 The Court's holding in Adarand
specifically extended strict scrutiny to the federal government. 39 This
means that affirmative action programs established by states or by the
federal government must have a compelling justification and the
means that the government chooses to implement the programs must
be narrowly tailored to achieving the goals of the legislation. The
question today, then, is whether affirmative action programs
established by public colleges and universities can survive the
exacting requirements of strict scrutiny.
II. THE EFFECT OF STRICT SCRUTINY ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN
HIGHER EDUCATION
The Supreme Court has not decided any higher education cases
since Bakke,40 but appellate decisions that have applied strict scrutiny
34. After Croson, dozens of localities established race-conscious programs following the
criteria that were suggested in Justice O'Connor's opinion. Some of these programs have been
struck down as unconstitutional; others have survived legal challenges. See, e.g., Associated
Gen. Contractors v. Coalition for Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1991); Coral
Construction Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991).
35. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
36. See id. The first FCC regulation treated minority ownership and management as a plus
factor during hearings that were held to determine the award of new broadcasting licenses.
Under the second policy, the FCC allowed licenses to be transferred to minority-owned
business enterprises without a competitive hearing. Both policies were adopted to encourage
minority ownership of broadcasting facilities. See id. at 556-58.
37. See id. at 564-65.
38. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
39. See id. at 227.
40. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
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have not been encouraging to affirmative action proponents. In one
case, Podberesky v. Kirwan,4 1 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit invalidated a University of Maryland program that
designated certain scholarships for African-American students.42 The
University created the program after years of failing to satisfy its duty
to eliminate the vestiges of de jure segregation.43 After exhausting
other strategies, Maryland developed a scholarship program that was
targeted at black students. 44 Despite a long and well-documented
history of race discrimination at the University of Maryland, the
Fourth Circuit found that there was no compelling justification for the
program.45 The court held that the University had not adequately
documented discriminatory conduct.46 The court also found that the
scholarship strategy was not narrowly tailored to achieving the
University's goal of increasing the enrollment of African-American
students because, among other things, the pool of eligible students
included out-of-state residents.47
41. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994).
42. See id.
43. Prior to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the NAACP challenged
segregation laws in the educational context in several court battles, one of which involved the
law school of the University of Maryland. See Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590 (Md. Ct. App.
1936). After the Brown decision, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare's Office of
Civil Rights (OCR) began an effort to force Maryland to integrate its colleges and universities.
These efforts of the OCR eventually culminated in the creation of the Banneker scholarship
program which was at issue in the Podberesky litigation. See 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994).
44. See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 838 F.Supp 1075, 1081 (D. Md. 1993). The Banneker
scholarship program was the fifth plan that the state proposed to the OCR. The first was
submitted in 1970 and rejected in 1973 as inadequate. The OCR accepted a revised plan in
1974, but the OCR later found it necessary to threaten to commence enforcement proceedings
based on Maryland's failure to implement the 1973 plan. In 1978, the OCR again concluded
that Maryland was not making adequate progress toward desegregating its colleges and
universities. The OCR also rejected the state's fourth proposed compliance plan as inadequate.
See id. at 1080-81.
45. See Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 155. Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall was the
victim of Maryland's discriminatory policies when he was forced to attend Howard University
Law School. Maryland's segregation policy barred him from attending the University of
Maryland. See MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND
THE SUPREME COURT 1936-1961, at 9 (1994).
46. See Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 155.
47. See id. at 158-59. The court examined the factors delineated in United States v.
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987), to determine whether the program was narrowly tailored to
achieving a legitimate governmental interest. These factors included: (1) the efficacy of
alternative remedies; (2) the flexibility and duration of the relief; (3) the relationship of the
numerical goals to the percentage of minorities in the relevant population; and (4) the impact of
1998]
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A subsequent case, Hopwood v. Texas,48 involved a challenge to
an admissions program developed by the University of Texas School
of Law.49 Three unsuccessful law school applicants filed a civil
action alleging that the law school's admission procedure, which
considered the ethnicity of minority applicants, violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 50 The district court
invalidated the University of Texas program because the University
considered minority applicants for admission separately from non-
minority candidates. sl However, the district court reaffirmed the
validity of affirmative action.52 The district court held that the
program indeed had a compelling justification because of the history
of discrimination practiced by the state of Texas. 3 It also found,
however, that the program was not narrowly tailored because of the
manner in which the University processed the applications.
5 4
When the case reached the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, the court issued an opinion that went farther than the
trial court's decision.55 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court
decision, but specifically rejected the promotion of ethnic diversity as
a legitimate academic goal.56 The Fifth Circuit held that affirmative
action is unlawful except when it is used to remedy the effects of past
discrimination.57 Under this approach, affirmative action would be
the relief on the rights of third parties. See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171.
48. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
49. See id. at 934.
50. See id. at 938.
51. Seeid.
52. See Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551,582-84 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
53. See id. at 569-73.
54. See id. at 573-79. The admission process at the University of Texas permitted
presumptive admissions based on high undergraduate grades and high LSAT scores.
Presumptive denials were made on the basis of low grades and low LSAT scores. The middle
range consisted of discretionary admissions that were determined by the admissions committee
on an individualized basis. A separate procedure was used to evaluate the qualifications of
minority applicants. These were reviewed by three members of an admissions subcommittee.
Subject to the chair's review, minority applicants who received two or three favorable votes
from the subcommittee were admitted. See id. at 557-63. This separation of minority applicants
from the rest of the applicant pool was the critical flaw that provided the basis for the majority's
ruling against the University of California in Bakke. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265,320 (1978).
55. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
56. Seeid.at944-48.
57. See id. at 949.
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permissible only if it is used to remedy discrimination practiced by a
specific unit within a university after the program has been
authorized by state legislation.5 8 In the Fifth Circuit's view, the
promotion of diversity in academic settings is a legitimate goal, but
ethnicity is an illegitimate consideration in the promotion of
diversity.59 Race, it found, is not a valid proxy for background or
experience.6 The Fifth Circuit panel explained that:
[S]tate supported schools may reasonably consider a host of
factors-some of which may have some correlation with
race-in making admissions decisions .... A university may
properly favor one applicant over another because of his ability
to play the cello, make a downfield tackle, or understand chaos
theory. An admissions process may also consider an
applicant's home state or relationship to school alumni. Law
schools specifically may look at things such as unusual or
substantial extracurricular activities in college, which may be
atypical factors affecting undergraduate grades. Schools may
even consider such factors as whether an applicant's parents
attended college or the applicant's economic or social
background.6'
This Orwellian definition of diversity would have been satisfied
by the 1948 graduating class at the University of Mississippi. Race is
not a collateral matter to individuals who are regularly subjected to
different and less favorable treatment than whites. African-Americans
who live in urban areas would be astonished by the panel's
suggestion that the segregated communities in which they live and
the segregated schools that they attend do not shape their attitudes
and perceptions. 62 Experiences of this sort are not limited to
minorities at the lower end of the economic spectrum. High income
African-Americans regularly experience discrimination in encounters
that range from the petty to the profound. 3 The suggestion that
58. See id. at 949-52.
59, See id. at 946-47.
60. See id.
61. Id. at 946.
62. See id.
63. See, e.g., ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS (1993).
1998]
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African-Americans and other minorities do not share unique, racially-
defined experiences is simply factually inaccurate. Contrary to the
Fifth Circuit's suggestions in Hopwood, an African-American student
from a public housing project in Chicago's South Side has a far
different set of experiences than a white student from an affluent
suburb of the same city. The same is true of Mexican-American
students from south Texas, where Spanish may be the primary
language, or an Asian-American student from San Francisco. The
diversity of these individuals' experiences, and the varying
perspectives that result from them, are what enrich the academic
enterprise.
The diversity analysis was not the only flaw in the Hopwood
opinion. The Fifth Circuit panel also found that Justice Powell's
endorsement of the diversity rationale in Bakke "garnered only his
own vote and has never represented the view of a majority of the
Court in Bakke or any other case." 64 As a result, it concluded that
"Justice Powell's view in Bakke [was] not binding precedent on this
issue. ' 65 This is not an accurate interpretation of Bakke. The Supreme
Court struck down the University of California's admissions
procedure in Bakke, but the majority affirmed the validity of
affirmative action in general.66 The debate among the Justices that
constituted the majority in Bakke was whether to apply strict scrutiny
rather than some lower level of review. On this issue, four Justices-
William Brennan, Byron White, Thurgood Marshall and Harry
Blacknun-believed that affirmative action was constitutionally
permissible and should not have been subjected to strict scrutiny.67
Justice Powell wrote a separate opinion that concurred with the
conclusion that affirmative action was permissible, but he would have
applied strict scrutiny rather than the lower standard urged by the
other Justices.68 Because Justice Powell approved of affirmative
action, but differed from the other Justices on whether to apply strict
64. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944.
65. Id.
66. See Bakke, 483 U.S. at 271.
67. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
68. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90. Justice Powell stated that "[tjhe guarantee of equal
protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when
applied to a person of another color." Id.
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scrutiny, the Bakke majority would not have agreed with the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Hopwood, which rejected race as a component
of diversity.69 Contrary to the Fifth Circuit's suggestion, Bakke
continues to be binding precedent.
The Hopwood Panel's assertion that post-Bakke decisions require
the abandonment of diversity as a justification for affirmative action
is also flawed. In Metro Broadcasting v. FCC,70 a majority of Justices
upheld the FCC's reliance on diversity as the justification for the
award of broadcast licenses to minority entrepreneurs. 71 The holding
in Adarand v. Pena72 does not alter this conclusion. Adarand and
Metro Broadcasting differ on the extent of the enforcement powers
granted to Congress by the Fourteenth Amendment.73 The original
decision to apply strict scrutiny to affirmative action programs relied
heavily on a distinction that the plurality in Croson found between
the powers granted to states and the authority possessed by the
federal government.74 This distinction was necessary because an
earlier decision, Fullilove v. Klutznick, endorsed the validity of
programs established by the federal government. 75 The result in
Fullilove was based on the plurality's analysis of Congress's powers
under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 76 In the years that
69. As a California court explained in DeRonde v. Regents of the University of California,
625 P.2d 220 (Cal. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832 (1981), "[tjhe Brennan opinion,
representing the views of four justices, would have upheld the Davis quota system invalidated
by the majority in Bakke. It may fairly be concluded that a race-conscious law school admission
program that did not involve a quota, a fortiori, would be sustained by those holding the
Brennan view." Id. at 225.
70, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
71. Seeid.at569.
72. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
73. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
74. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 490-91.
75. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). In Fullilove, the Court validated a
procurement program that authorized federal grants to state public works programs only if 10%
of the amount of the grant was allocated to minority enterprises. See id. (discussing 42 U.S.C.
§ 6705(f(2) (1976)).
76. See id. at 476. Section Five authorizes Congress "to enforce, by appropriate
legislation" the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 5. The Fullilove Court found that pursuant to this provision, Congress is authorized to
enact legislation designed to eliminate procurement practices that perpetuate the effects of past
discrimination. This determination by the plurality provided the basis for the first prong of the
heightened scrutiny test applied in Fullilove. The second prong addressed whether the use of
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followed, several localities enacted minority "set-aside" programs,
relying on Fullilove.
In Croson, Justice O'Connor found that this reliance was
misplaced.77 She reasoned that Congress's power to enact affirmative
action programs was based on authority that the states did not
possess. 78 She argued that Congress has broad powers under Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to eradicate the effects of
discrimination, but a similar grant of authority was not given to the
states.79 This distinction provided the analytical foundation for
treating state-sponsored affirmative action programs differently from
those created by the federal government. Remarkably, when the
Adarand Court extended the Croson rationale to the federal
government, the Court did not discuss the Section Five analysis that
was so critical to the outcome of Croson. Adarand overruled Metro
Broadcasting to the extent that it applied strict scrutiny to the federal
government, but it did not consider the critical question that was
involved in Hopwood: whether diversity constitutes a compelling
justification for the purposes of strict scrutiny. Despite the Fifth
Circuit's suggestions in Hopwood, Metro Broadcasting, the only
post-Bakke case to consider diversity, reaffirmed its legitimacy as a
justification for affirmative action.
Hopwood also failed to give any consideration to the special
circumstances of states like Texas that have long practiced de jure
segregation. In the late 1960s, the Supreme Court held that states
which had enacted laws requiring segregation had "an affirmative
duty to eliminate all vestiges of the separate educational systems.
80
Inasmuch as elementary and high school attendance is mandatory,
and school districts are based on residential districts, lower courts
were uncertain as to whether this affirmative duty extended to
colleges and universities. 81 Some lower courts held that the
affirmative duty did not apply because the decision to attend a
racial and ethnic criteria was a permissible means of achieving the objectives of the legislation.
See 488 U.S. at 480.
77. See Croson, 488 U.S. at491.
78. Seeid. at490-91.
79. See id
80. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430,437 (1968).
81. See United States. v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717,727 (1996).
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particular college, they reasoned, was largely a matter of private
choice.82 In these cases, the courts found that the duty to desegregate
institutions of higher education was satisfied by the adoption of race-
neutral admission policies. 3 Other courts found that the affirmative
duty to desegregate applied to colleges and universities.
In United States v. Fordice,84 the Supreme Court held that, like
primary and secondary schools, colleges and universities must take
whatever steps are necessary to eliminate all vestiges of segregation
"root and branch."85 The Court thus rejected the neutral approach.
Given the long and well-documented history of discrimination
practiced by Texas educational institutions, the University of Texas
was obligated under Fordice to take whatever actions were required
to eliminate the vestiges of segregation. 86 Because Fordice rejected
the neutrality argument, an affirmative action admissions program
was a permissible means of accomplishing this goal.
The Hopwood opinion does not provide a sound basis for the
resolution of the affirmative action debate.87 It redefined diversity,
misconstrued Bakke, misapplied Metro Broadcasting, and ignored
Fordice. In addition to distorting relevant precedent, Hopwood
downplayed the effects of discrimination on people of color and
exaggerated the consequences of affirmative action for whites. The
Fifth Circuit's analysis was badly flawed, if not entirely
disingenuous.88
III. TAXMAN V. BOARD OFEDUCATION
The Supreme Court was slated to decide an employment case,
Taxman v. Board of Education of the Township of Piscataway,89
during its 1997-1998 term. Taxman was the first employment case to
reach the Supreme Court since the Court had decided in Croson to
82. See id. at 729.
83 See id.
84. 505 U.S. 717 (1996).
85. See id. at 729.
86, See id.
87. See 78 F.3d 932 (1996).
88, See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Breaking Thurgood Marshall's Promise, N.Y. TxMEs,
Jan. 18, 1998, at 28.
89. 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997).
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apply strict scrutiny to affirmative action programs. However, the
Court never issued an opinion in Taxman because, to forestall what
was seen as a potential setback for affirmative action, the parties
settled the case before the Court could rule on it.90
Taxman involved a challenge to affirmative action in employment
that was brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.91 A
different analytical standard has emerged for such challenges brought
under Title VII. Beginning with the 1979 decision in Steelworkers of
America v. Weber,92 the Supreme Court has held that affirmative
action programs are justified under Title VII when there are
"manifest ... imbalances" in the percentage of minority workers in
"traditionally segregated job classifications." 93 This lower standard
allows employers to establish voluntary affirmative action programs
if the percentage of minorities or females in a company's workforce
is significantly lower than the percentage of qualified minority
workers in the geographic region where the company's facility is
located.
The specific issue in Taxman was whether affirmative action
90. The settlement was effectuated by a coalition of civil rights groups based on their
concern that a decision in Taxman would have undermined the legitimacy of affirmative action.
See Black & White Case, 84 ABA J. 33 (January 1998).
91. See id. at 1549-50.
92. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
93. Id. at 197. Most of the Supreme Court's affirmative action decisions have arisen in the
context of employment. In Weber, the Court found that an affirmative action program, which
designated a specified number of training positions for black employees, did not violate Title
VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964. Several years later, the Court approved voluntary
programs established by governmental employers when it held that sex could be legitimately
used as a plus factor in a multi-faceted promotion process. See Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987). In Sheet Metal Workers International Association v. EEOC, 478
U.S. 421 (1986), the Supreme Court sustained a lower court's decision that required a labor
union to admit specific percentages of minority workers after it engaged in discriminatory
hiring practices and failed to comply with orders requiring it to abandon its unlawful conduct.
See id. The Supreme Court also approved negotiated consent decrees that benefited individuals
who were not themselves the victims of the employer's discriminatory conduct. See United
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); International Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of
Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986). In Firefighters Local Union Number 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S.
561 (1984), the Court held that a consent decree that created temporary hiring and promotion
preferences for minority employees, but that did not address layoffs, could not be construed to
require the retention of minority workers at a time when non-minority employees were being
terminated. In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986), the Court struck
down a collective bargaining agreement that required the retention of probationary minority
teachers when tenured non-minority teachers were being laid off. See id.
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considerations warranted laying off a white teacher who had the same
seniority rights as a black teacher who the school board retained.94 In
making the decision to fire the white teacher, the school board relied
on diversity-in this instance, the desirability of maintaining a
racially-mixed teaching staff.95 The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that the School Board's actions were unlawful.96 It found
that affirmative action is permissible under Title VII, but only when it
is used to remedy the present effects of past discrimination. 97 The
parties conceded, however, that there was no evidence that the school
district had a history of discriminating against black teachers, nor was
there an imbalance of black teachers employed by the school
system.98  Because there was no "manifest imbalance" in a
"traditionally segregated job classification," the question in Taxman
was whether the school district's goal of maintaining a racially-
diverse teaching population was an adequate justification for laying
off a white teacher who had the same seniority as a black teacher who
was retained.
In Bakke, Justice Powell's opinion recognized diversity as a
compelling justification under strict scrutiny.99 Relying on that
opinion, most American colleges and universities have established
affirmative action programs that are premised, almost entirely, on
considerations of diversity. The legal status of these programs is
uncertain because the diversity justification was rejected by the Fifth
Circuit in Hopwood and by the Third Circuit in Taxman. If Taxman
had proceeded to a Supreme Court decision, this issue would
undoubtedly have been addressed by the Justices.
The concerns of the civil rights groups who urged the settlement
of the Taxman case were well-founded. In two previous cases,
94. SeeTaxman, 91 F.3dat 1551.
95. See id. The teacher who was not laid off was the only black teacher in the school
district's business education department. See id.
96. See id. at 1565.
97. Seeidl at 1557.
98. See id. at 1563.
99. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-15. Justice Powell stated that programs designed to attain
diverse student bodies are "clearly ... constitutionally permissible .... Id. at 311-12. He went
on to say that "[t]he atmosphere of 'speculation, experiment and creation'-so essential to the
quality of higher education-is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body." Id.
at 312.
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Firefighters Local Union Number 1784 v. Stottsl°° and Wygant v.
Jackson County School Board,'10 a Supreme Court that was far more
receptive to affirmative action than the present Court held that layoffs
could not be used to advance the goal of diversity. The Wygant case,
for example, involved a school district that laid off tenured white
teachers while retaining less senior black teachers. 02 One of the
justifications proffered by the school board was the need for black
teachers to serve as "role models" for black students.10 3 This rationale
was rejected. The Court found that, unlike hiring decisions, layoffs
impair settled expectations that are based on valuable seniority
rights.1 4 Using layoffs to maintain a racially-balanced teaching force
was not narrowly tailored because it was far too intrusive even in
circumstances where affirmative action hiring might have been
permissible. 05 The decision in Wygant seems to be virtually
dispositive of the claims asserted in Taxman. The Supreme Court has
found that affirmative action cannot justify layoffs that aim to
maintain a racially-diverse teaching force. This does not mean,
however, that diversity considerations do not justify affirmative
action in scholastic admissions.
IV. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION iN HIGHER EDUCATION
Affirmative action is premised on a determination that a simple
prohibition against discrimination will not dismantle the elaborate
system of racial subordination that segregation policies have created.
The most obvious examples of the lingering effects of segregation
can be found in public schools and housing patterns in most urban
areas. Despite more than thirty years of anti-discrimination laws, the
housing patterns that prevail in most cities reflect "hyper-
100. Firefighters Local Union Number 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
101. Wygant v. Jackson Cty. Sch. Bd., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
102. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 272.
103. See id. at 272-83.
104. See id. In addition, the majority found that the role model theory was invalid because
it had "no logical stopping point," and it did not bear a demonstrable relationship to any harm
caused by prior discriminatory hiring practices. Id. at 275.
105. See id. at 283-84. Justice Powell believed that "[o]ther, less intrusive means of
accomplishing similar purposes-such as the adoption of hiring goals--[were] available." Id.
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segregation."' 1 6 Because school attendance zones are based on
residential districts, the racial demographics of the public schools
reflect the segregated housing patterns of the communities they serve.
These conditions persist decades after the laws enforcing segregation
were eliminated. The neutral standard that traditionalists urge would
ignore these realities and proceed as if segregation never existed.
Unlike the neutral standard, affirmative action policies take these
conditions into account. Affirmative action gives decision makers an
incentive to engage in conduct that is aimed at ameliorating the
disparities resulting from decades of racial exclusion. This is the
remedial justification for affirmative action programs.
In higher education, this remedial justification has been merged
with the long-standing recognition of the value of diversity in
academic settings. 107 Under this approach to education, students from
different backgrounds are brought together in a single academic
community. This mix is considered by many to enrich classroom
discussions because of the varying perspectives that students bring to
the academic enterprise.10 8 Consideration of race in this context does
not, as some critics charge, promote racial stereotypes nor does it
assume that all minorities think alike.109 There are, of course, a broad
range of perspectives within minority communities. W.E.B. DuBois
did not agree with Booker T. Washington.110 Martin Luther King did
not agree with Malcolm X."' Thomas Sowell does not agree with
bell hooks. 1 2 There is not a singular "minority" perspective. The
point of considering race, however, is that the legacy of
discrimination does cause whites and people of color to experience
106. See MASSEY & DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING
OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993).
107. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-15.
108. As the Supreme Court explained in Keyishaian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967), "[t]he Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that
robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than
through any kind of authoritative selection."' Id. at 603 (quoting United States v. Associated
Press, D.C., 52 F. Supp 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
109. See, e.g., Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
110. See DAVID LEVERING LEWIS, W.E.B DuBOIS - A BIOGRAPHY OF A RACE, 1868-1919
(1993).
111. See TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1963-1965
(1998).
112. See BELL HOOKS, BLACK LOOKS: RACE AND REPRESENTATION (1992).
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life in dramatically different ways; and these experiences shape their
perspectives. This difference is what matters for the purposes of
determining diversity.
Individuals familiar with the university admissions process know
that decisions concerning which students to admit are far more
complicated than selecting applicants with the highest grades and test
scores." 3 These quantitative factors are merely predictors of
performance in an academic setting. The actual question is which
individuals should be selected from a pool of students, all of whom
are capable of performing in a satisfactory manner. Given the decline
in the number of students available to attend any higher education
institution, the increase in the number of higher education institutions
since the end of World War II, and the shifting demographics of the
student population, the question of what constitutes a fair admissions
process is far more complicated now than it has ever been. It requires,
at a minimum, consideration of the circumstances of individual
applicants.
The desirability of diversity in academic environments is well
recognized 1 4 In the case of admissions, however, the desire for a
diverse student body conflicts with the view that the brightest
students are entitled to be favored over other applicants. This belief is
premised on an unfounded assumption that merit can be accurately
measured through a combination of grades and standardized test
scores." 5 The arguments of affirmative action opponents are
premised entirely on this erroneous assumption. It is well known in
academic circles that standardized test scores are not a precise
predictor of student performance. The strongest claim that can be
made for such examinations is a correlation between performance
and scores at the very highest and lowest levels. In the vast middle
range, however, where the majority of students fall, the predictive
value of such examinations is marginal." 6 Standardized examinations
113. See Michael A. Olivas, Constitutional Criteria: The Social Science and Common Law
ofAdmissions Decisions in Higher Education, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 1065 (1997).
114. See Neil Rudenstein, The Uses ofDiversity, HARV. MAG., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 49.
115. See Olivas, supra note 113.
116. For an analysis of how this is demonstrated in the context of the Law School Aptitude
Test, see Robert R. Ramsey, Law School Admissions: Science, Art or Hunch? 12 J. LEO. EDUC.
503, 514 (1960); John A. Winterbottom, Comments on "A Study of the Criteria For Legal
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are an imperfect measure of white students, but they are even far less
reliable predictors for minority students. Standardized examinations
also have a disparate impact because the average scores of black and
Latino students are lower than the average scores of whites.' 17 An
over-reliance on test scores will disproportionately exclude minority
applicants. 18
As two of the leading authorities in higher education law have
observed, "affirmative action is based on the concept that equal
treatment of differently situated individuals may itself produce
inequality; different standards for such individuals become
appropriate when the use of uniform standards would in effect
discriminate against them." 119  The discriminatory effect of
standardized examinations was recognized by Justice Powell in
Bakke when he suggested that race and ethnic background could be
considered for the purpose of correcting inaccuracies that result from
bias in testing procedures. 120 In Defunis v. Odegaard,121 Justice
William 0. Douglas argued at length that a selection process that did
not consider cultural differences would not promote equality.
22
Because of the complexities of the process, a decision regarding
which applicant is best suited for admission is a complex judgment
which should be left to the individual institution. It is not a matter of
selecting applicants with the highest grades and test scores, nor
should it be. Preferences for the children of alumni, special
consideration for in-state students, and weighing athletic, artistic, or
Education and Admission to the Bar": An Article by Dr. Thomas M. Goolsby, Jr., 21 J. LEG.
EDUC. 75, 79 (1968); Linda F. Wrightman, Predictive Validity of the LSAT: A National
Summary of the 1990-1992 Correlation Studies, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL RESEARCH
REPORT 93-95 (1993).
117. See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
118. See Linda F. Wrightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical
Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admissions
Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1997). Wrightman argues that the LSAT is not biased against
minority students, but she explains the disparate impact of these examinations on minority
students. She also argues against the use of grades and test scores as the exclusive means of
determining which students should be admitted.
119. WILLIAM A. KAPLIN & BARBARA A. LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION (3d ed.
1995).
120. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306 n.43.
121. Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
122. See id at 327-44 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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musical talents are admissions practices that are not seriously
questioned. These are intangible qualities that are not capable of
objective measurement. Courts are not equipped to second-guess
judgments that evaluate the many considerations that an admission
decision requires. These decisions fall within the province of matters
that are best handled by academics. As Justice Frankfurter explained
in Sweezy v. New Hampshire:
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere
which is most conductive to speculation, experiment and
creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail "the four
essential freedoms" of a university - to determine for itself on
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it
shall be taught and who may be admitted to study.'3
This does not mean that universities are not accountable for
invidious discrimination, but it does obligate courts to defer to the
judgments of academics in deciding "who may be admitted to study."
Affirmative action policies that promote diversity are entitled to the
deference that principles of academic freedom require.
V. THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
The question for colleges and universities is whether diversity will
remain an adequate justification for affimative action programs. If
Justice Powell's reasoning in Bakke retains its influence, race
legitimately can be used as a factor in a selection process to achieve
the goal of student body diversity. The question now is whether a
majority of the current Supreme Court Justices will remain faithful to
Justice Powell's analysis in Bakke, agree with the panel in Hopwood,
or find some middle ground between the two positions.
The Supreme Court's most recent decisions indicate that its
commitment to desegregation is weakening. In Missouri v. Jenkins,124
the affirmative duty to eliminate all vestiges of segregation in public
123. Sweezy v. New Hampshire. 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
see also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Academic Freedom and Tenure;
A Statement ofPrinciples, 1940 BULL. AM. ASS'N U. PROFESSORS, Feb. 1942, at 84.
124. 515 U.S. 570 (1995).
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schools that was originally established in Green v. County School
Board,125 was lowered to a standard that merely requires good faith
compliance. Under this revised standard, segregation that is not
directly attributable to the conduct of school boards will not be
considered when a court is determining whether the school district
has satisfied its desegregation obligation. This means that almost all
urban school districts will be deemed to have reached "unitary"
status, even though most of them remain segregated. Because the
Court is willing to disregard the continuing segregation in primary
and secondary schools, there is no reason to believe that it will take a
different view of colleges and universities. When an admissions case
finally reaches the Supreme Court, the outcome could be the
imposition of a color-blind standard or, at minimum, the elimination
of affirmative action except as a remedy for discrimination practiced
by an individual institution. Either approach would inevitably result
in the re-segregation of higher education.
Affirmative action has been controversial since it first emerged as
a social policy in the late 1960s. Despite the intensity of the
opposition to affirmative action, during the 1960s and '70s,
affirmative action was greeted with enthusiasm in higher education.
When affirmative action cases reached the Supreme Court, a majority
of the Justices endorsed the validity of the programs, although they
could not agree on the applicable standard of review. The opposition
to affirmative action continued despite the Court's repeated findings
that such programs were permissible. In the early 1980s, the Reagan
administration challenged race-conscious remedies at every
opportunity. This effort did not succeed at first, but affirmative action
became more difficult to justify when the majority decided to apply
strict scrutiny in Croson. The extension of this heightened level of
review to federal programs in Adarand has jeopardized the status of
all affirmative action programs. The courts are not the only arena in
which affirmative action has been challenged. The Ninth Circuit's
decision upholding Proposition 209, the California anti-affirmative
action initiative, has generated similar proposals in the United States
House of Representatives and in several state legislatures.
125. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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The debate about affirmative action reflects more than a
disagreement over legal doctrine and public policy. Affirmative
action has become a potent symbol of a perceived threat to white
privilege. This is why conservative political leaders have exploited
affirmative action to secure the support of voters who are disaffected
towards this policy. California's Governor Pete Wilson, a long-time
supporter of affirmative action, apparently changed his mind when he
thought he could ride the anti-affirmative action bandwagon into the
White House. His political aspirations were not successful, but
Proposition 209 was the direct result of his efforts. Wilson's strategy
appealed to the sentiments of whites who comfort themselves with
anecdotes of opportunities lost to "less qualified" minorities. They
apparently believe that jobs lost as a result of new technologies,
corporate downsizing, and the globalization of production will be
restored if the government will simply stop requiring employers to
hire "unqualified" minorities. These fears are completely unfounded.
The perception that minorities have an unfair advantage is
conclusively rebutted by almost every empirical study.
Appeals to emotion should not displace reasoned analysis. The
color-blindness argument implies an equitable approach, but it would
actually impose a standard that will not promote racial equality. A
neutral approach would treat whites and racial minorities as if they
were similarly-situated. This disregards the circumstances resulting
from three centuries of state-sanctioned discrimination and the
continuing effects of those policies on African-Americans and other
people of color. Thirty years of anti-discrimination laws have not
eliminated the disparities that segregation created. Instead of
advancing equality, the imposition of a neutral standard will merely
prolong the disparities that segregation created.
Traditional considerations of equity require that individuals
injured by unlawful conduct be placed, as nearly as possible, in the
position that they would have occupied if the injury had not
occurred. 126 If African-Americans and other people of color cannot be
placed in the positions that they would have occupied if segregation
had not been imposed, they should be provided with some means of
126. See, e.g., Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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surmounting the continuing disadvantages that are directly
attributable to that system. Affirmative action policies are aimed at
rectifying the injuries that segregation inflicted.
CONCLUSION
The ultimate resolution of the affirmative action debate depends
upon how the Supreme Court will interpret the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There are at least two
competing perspectives. The first perspective views the Fourteenth
Amendment and other federal anti-discrimination laws as creating an
obligation to eliminate racial discrimination and the historical
disadvantages that minorities still endure. Under the second
perspective, all institutional decisions must be race-neutral and free
from any government-imposed requirements. This latter view ignores
the realities of race in America.
The evolution of equal protection jurisprudence cannot be
separated from the history of race relations in the United States. In
1868 the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in reaction to the
"Black Codes" that were enacted by Southern states. 127 These laws
threatened to return the newly freed slaves to a subordinated status.
The Reconstruction era that followed was a period of substantial
progress for African-Americans. Schools that provided educational
opportunities for black students were established. Blacks were
elected to the United States House of Representatives and dozens of
state and local governments. This progress was cut short by the
Hayes-Tilden Compromise which represented the beginning of the
end of Reconstruction. Federal troops were withdrawn from the
former Confederacy. Control of state legislatures reverted to the
white majorities. African-Americans were subordinated and
disfranchised by a pattern of violence and others forms of
intimidation.
121
As the nineteenth century drew to a close, laws that established
127. See generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION (1990); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM
SLAVERY TO FREEDOM (1994); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW
(1974).
128. See FONER, supra note 127.
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"Grandfather clauses," poll taxes, and "understanding" provisions
nullified voting rights that were established by the Fifteenth
Amendment.129 During the same period, racial segregation was
sanctioned by the Supreme Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson.1
30
This case provided the foundation for an elaborate system of state-
sponsored subordination developed under the "separate but equal"
doctrine. Of course, the facilities that were reserved for African-
Americans were always separate, but never equal.
In the late 1930s, a long-range, carefully orchestrated campaign to
eliminate segregation was developed by the NAACP. The
"equalization" strategy challenged segregation in schools, housing,
public transportation, and voting.131 The NAACP's lawyers initially
sought to assure that the segregated facilities provided for African-
Americans were actually equal to those reserved for whites without
directly challenging the Plessy doctrine.' 32 After a series of favorable
rulings in the equalization cases, the NAACP mounted a direct
challenge to segregation itself in Brown v. Board of Education.133
After the Brown decision, the courts employed strict scrutiny to
invalidate other laws that enforced segregation. A decade later,
Congress enacted a series of civil rights laws that prohibited
discrimination in employment, public accommodations, voting, and
housing. 34 These advances merely represented a starting point for
efforts to dismantle the elaborate structure that segregation
established. The Southern states reacted to Brown with a campaign of
"massive resistance" that continued for several years. Serious efforts
to desegregate schools did not commence until the early 1970s.
129. See id
130. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
131. See JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF
LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1994); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE
JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S
STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1994); MARK TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD
MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961 (1994).
132. See, e.g., McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
133. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
134. See Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-17 (1994) (employment and public
accommodation); Civil Rights Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 245, 2101- 2102, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-
1341 (1994); The Voting Rights Act of 1965,42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb (1994).
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TURNING BACK THE CLOCK
During the same period, the relocation of white families to suburban
areas accelerated. As a result, segregated housing patterns became
even more prevalent. 135 Twenty-five years later, states that practiced
de jure segregation are still in the process of dismantling segregated
educational systems.136 Private institutions and state-supported
schools outside of the South are endeavoring to overcome the effects
of practices that excluded minority students.
Whether these institutions should be allowed to maintain race-
conscious admissions programs is one of the critical questions
presented by the affirmative action debate. As the Court explained in
Brown, "[i]n approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back
to 1868 when the [Fourteenth] Amendment was adopted, or even to
1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.' 3 7  The same
considerations apply in equal measure to the affirmative action
debate. The appeals for color-blindness are a century too late. The
demands to end affirmative action are a generation too early. If
student body diversity is allowed to remain as a legitimate academic
goal, the background and circumstances of individual students is a
necessary consideration in the admissions process. Given the history
and legacy of segregation, a minority applicant's ethnicity is
inextricably intertwined with that individual's opinions, social
beliefs, and perspective.
135. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 106.
136. See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
137. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492.
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